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I. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to review the studies on the narrative discourse. First, 
it will describe the historical background and the eventual emergence of the story 
grammar or story schema. Particular attention will be given to the models of story 
grammar developed by cognitive psychologists. The story grammar which was originally 
proposed by Rumelhart (975) and its subsequent revisions will be reviewed by pointing 
out some of the critical drawbacks in these schemata. 
Secondly, studies on children's narratives in the framework of the story grammar 
will be reviewed with an attempt at finding out the implications of the story grammar 
for the children's comprehension and production of stories. 
Thirdly, some suggestions for the use of story grammars in the study of children's 
story production and some possible ways of revising the models of story grammar which 
are currently employed by psychologists will be made. 
11 . Background 
The decade of the ]970' 8 can be characteri zed by attempts in linguistics to go beyond 
the sentential level. These attempts init iall y took place in semantics in which effort s 
were made to relate the syntactic surface structures with the underlying semantic 
representations. The first finding in these efforts was that there were no one-ta-one 
correspondences between surface syntactic structures and their semantic implications. 
A syntactic structure often carries multiple, ambiguous meanings. At the same time, 
we found the reversed cases in which a number of meanings are surfaced in a single 
surface syntactic structure. That is, a simple sentence can be interpreted in a number 
of different ways depending on the situations and the mental setup of the speaker and 
the hearer. Thus the standard theory of Aspects (Chomsky 1965) had to face a signi-
ficant revision in the 1970's, the result of which was the incorporation of "pragmatics" 
in the generative linguistic theory. As a consequence, an inversion of places of syntax 
and semantics was achieved. Now, semantics is considered as underlying syntax in 
contrast to the standard model in which syntax was the core of grammar and seman-
tics was simply an "interpretive" component, which peripherally assigned gemantic 
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interpretations to syntactic forms. A corollary of this revision was an expansion of 
linguistic perspective which went "beyond sentence" to a larger linguistic unit, that is, 
"discourse." A discourse is a connected speech which is composed of one or more sen-
tences with a "thematic" unity of organization. We thus find a variety of discourses: 
narratives, conversations, procedures, expositions, novels, dramas, lectures, poems. The 
forms of discourse which have received noticeable attention in the past ten years are 
narratives and conversations. Studies of expositions and procedures are just beginning 
to emerge. 
Three linguists of interest stand out conspicuously whose expertise is m discourse. 
They are Chafe (1970, 1972, 1979, 1980), Labov (1972; Labov and Waletzky 1967), 
and Longacre (1976, 1980). The studies these three linguists have done are mostl y on 
narratives. Chafe was mainly concerned with the cognitive side of narrative. Labov's 
and Longacre' s works were more of linguistic in nature. Both characterized the nar-
rative in terms of action behaviors of protagonist(s) and props in the narrative. Lin-
guistically, they characterized the narrative by the tense form of the verb, which is 
past. Expositions, on the other hand, were characterized by perfect and subjunctive 
tenses. 
Labov's superstructure consists of six components: Abstract, Orientation, Complica ting 
Action, Evaluation, Resolution (or Result) , and Coda. Complicating Action is the central 
component of a narrative, which describes the action behaviors of participants in :l 
temporal sequence. Abstract is a summary or gist of :l narrative. Orientat ion encom-
passes the introduction of participants and the temporo-spatial contexts in which the 
narrative took place. Evaluation has to do with the psychological statements in a nar-
rative which reinforce the reasons for the narrator's telling of the story, which, in a 
sense, help identify the narrator as an admirable hero in the narrative. Resolution is 
the conclusion of the narrative. Cod a is a statement whose function is to bring the 
narrator and the listener (s) from the imaginary past "tense" of the story to the rea l-
time present. Expressions such as "That's it" or "So I'm here telling you the story" are 
exemplary cod as. Codas are sometimes expressed as morals or lessons which we can 
infer from narratives. Orientation, Complicating Action, and Resolution are the three 
obligatory components which are necessary for a narrative to be complete. Abstract, 
Evaluation , and Coda are deletable, but with some damage incurred on the narrative. 
The tradition of the study of discourse is much longer in psychology than in lin-
guistics. The precursor of aIt the studies of discourse in cognitive psychology was 
Bartlett (1932). And we can say not unreasonably that psychologists today are still in 
the stage where they are only elaborating on the basic notions and concepts which 
were initally laid down by Bartlett. The two major methodologies Bartlett employed 
were the "serial reproduction" and the "repeated reproduction." In the serial reproduc-
tion, a story was told to a subject and this subject retold the story from memory to 
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the second subject, and the second subject to the third, and down the line for a number 
of subjects. The version of the story which was produced by the last subject was 
collected. In the task of repeated reproduction, a story was told to a single subject and 
he retold the same story a number of times from memory with time intervals between 
the reproductions. Again, the final version was collected and it was compared to the 
final version obtained from the serial reproduction. The surprising finding from this 
research was that the two versions of the story turned out to show the same charac-
teristics from which Bartlett concluded that there is some mechanism in the human 
minds which processes a story in the same direction. Bartlett's conclusions can be 
summarized in four items: (l) the recall of a story is "an active process of reconstruc-
tion rather than a simple reproduction," (2) the distortions found in the recalled ver-
sions of a story are not deteriorations, but rather qualitative normalizations to make the 
story a coherent whole, (3) the general theme or outline of a story is always remem-
bered, and (4) the schemata, the subject's pre-existing system or systems of knowledge 
and beliefs, i.e., the conventional conceptual frameworks, are actively participating 111 
the retention and/or recall of a story. 
The introduction of the crucial concept of schema opened a way for the better un-
derstanding of discourse and cognition in general. In fact, the schema has become the 
cornerstone on which a large portion of studies in the discourse was built. The concept 
of schema has since been expanded, elaborated, and used not only in psychology and 
linguistics (Rumelhart 1975; Abelson 1975, 1976; Chafe 1977a, 1977b; Fillmore 1975, 
1976), but also in artificial intelligence (Schank and Abelson 1975; Minsky 1974), 
anthropology (Bateson 1972; Hymes 1974; Frake 1977), and sociology (Goffman 
1974), The nomenclatures used for the concept have also been expanded to include 
such terms as "script," "frame," "plan," "goal," "theme," and even "scene," besides 
"schema." 
For the study of cognitive processes involved in the discourse- encoding, retention, 
and retrieval/recall of a story- the concept of schema has come to gain an utmost 
importance in that it has provided us with a theoretical framework which is testable. 
That is, the abstract concept of schema as a set of pre-existing knowledge and beliefs 
has become manageably formalized in the recent years. 
The formalization of the story schema took two different directions. One is the 
schema which is represented by Kintsch and van Dijk(Kintsch 1974; Kintsch and van 
Dijk 1978; van Dijk 1977, 1980; van Dijk and Kintsch 1977) and the other is the 
one which was pioneered by Rumelhart (1975) and later revised by others (Mandler 
and Johnson 1977; Stein and Glenn 1979; Thorndyke 1977) . 
The model of story schema developed by Kintsch and van Dijk is atomistic in that 
their definition of proposition, the minimal semantic unit of language, is from predicate 
calculus, which consists of one "predicate" and one or more "arguments." A "predicate" 
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IS an expression of relation, which is realized in a linguistic surface form of a verb, 
an adverb, an adjective, or a conjunction. An "argument" is an individual entity which 
participates in the relation or relations designated by the predicate in a specific propo-
sition. The number of arguments which can occur in a proposition is not limited in 
theory. Moreover, a proposition or propositions can be embedded in an argument. For 
example, the sentence, "A series of violent, bloody encounters between police and 
Black Panther Party members punctuated the early summer day of 1969," can be ana-
lyzed into 12 propositions as given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Example of propositional decompositi on (f rom Kintsc h and van Dijk 1978: 377) 
Propos it io n no. Proposition Propositi on no. 
Propos iti on 
(Pred icat e, Argument ) * (Predicate, Arg ument ) 
(Series, Encounte r ) 7 ( 13e t ween, Enco unter ) 
2 ( Violent , Enco unter ) i) ( in , Enco unter, Summe r ) 
3 (Bloody, Enco un ter ) !:I ( Early, S ummer) 
4 (Black, Pan ther ) 10 (Summer, Day ) 
5 (Panther, Party) 11 (Of, Summer day, 1969) 
6 (Party, Me mbers ) 12 (P unc tuated , 1-9, IQ-12) 
* The first e lement in the parentheses is the predi cate a nd th e o the r e lement or elemen ts a re 
a rgume nts. In Proposit ion 12, each of the two a rgument s is made up of a number of pr oposi-
t ions, p ropositions I to 9 making up the first argum en t a nd propositi ons 10 to 12, the secont! 
argument . 
The text-base for Kintsch and van Dijk consists of a set of propositions, which are 
micro· propositions. T ransformational macro· rules are applied when a person is asked to 
recall the text-base, the micro·s tructure, thus transforming it to a macro-structure. T he 
typical macro· rules they presented a re Generalization , Deletion, Integration, and Con-
struction. Brief explanation for each is as follows. 
Gene ra lizat ion 
Example: 
John was moving t he Chair.) 
John was moving the table. ===> John 
John was moving the chest. 
was mo v ing the /urnitnre. 
Genera lization, in essence, is a rule of entail ment, which says that Cl sC4uellce uf ;; 
propositions maybe substitu ted for by a proposition P, if P is entailed by each mem ber 
of I. In the example above, chair, table, ur chest entails furnitu re; the reverse of which, 
of course, is not true, that is, furniture does not en tail chair, table, or chest. 
De letion 
Example: 
Ma ry W<l S p layi ng with a blue ball and s he broke a window with the ball , 
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The macro-rule of deletion deletes irrelevant information. A proposition is considered 
irrelevant or unimportant if it is not a condition for the interpretation of another pro-
position. Thus, when we describe an episode in which Mary is playing with a blue ball 
and she breaks a window with it, the fact that the ball was blue is normally irrelevant 
or unimportant. Put differently, the breaking of the window is not the consequence of 
the "blueness" of the ball. 
Integration 
Example: 
John went to Paris yesterday. ) 
He took a cab to the station. 
He bought a ticket. 
He took the train to Paris. 
==> John went to Paris yesterday . 
More specific information may be deleted by the simple fact that its global information 
has already been expressed in the text-base by the proposition that serves as a macro-
proposition. The deletion in this case is different from the deletion of irrelevant infor-
mation. Here, in integration, deletions are the results of the selection of a macro-
proposition, i.e., "John went to Paris yesterday," which presupposes all the "normal" 
details of taking a cab, buying a ticket, and riding the train. However, if the details 
are not normal or conventional , they cannot be integrated by a macro-proposition. In 
"John fell from his chair. He broke his neck," for instance, the two propositions can-
not be integrated into a single proposition of "John fell from his chair," because falling 
from a chair does not normally presuppose breaking a heck. 
Construction 
Construction is a rule whi ch reorganizes a number of propositions on a macro· lev el and it ah u 
introduces new information. 
According to Kintsch and van Dijk (1978), the macro-rules of integration and con-
struction play significant roles in the recall of stories. One weakness of their model, 
however, is that they have not formalized the story schema in which the micro-
structure/ the text-base or the macro-structure/the recalled version of the story can be 
structurally interpreted, despite their emphasis on the importance of the story schema. 
The model as given today is an inductive mechanism working up from micro-proposi-
tions to macro-propositions via macro-rules. What should be complemented to their 
model is a deductive mechanism of the modeJ which was developed by Rumelhart 
(1975) and others. 
The latter model is deductive because the main concern of this model is the speci-
fication or the formalization of story schema in a form of grammatical rules, They 
employed the rule format of Chomskyan re-write rules (Chomsky 1965). 
The basic assumption underlying the story grammar is that the grammar exists in 
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our minds and it is evoked when we encode, retain, or decode (or recall ) a story. 
Moreover, the differential recalls of different structures or components/categories of a 
story are interpreted as reflecting the differential functions or degrees of importance of 
the corresponding structures or components. Thus the story grammar has become a 
powerful means for tapping the mental representations of stories. In the following sec-
tion will be presented four models of story grammar wi th some mentions of drawbacks 
of each model. 
I. Story Grammars 
1. Rumelhart (1975) 
Rumelhart's 0975: 219) rc-w rite rules for syntactic formation and semantic inter-
pretation are given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Rumelhart's rul es 
Cl ) Story ----> Setting+Episode 
~ [A LLOW (Sett ing, Epi sode) ] 
(2) Setting ----> (States) * 
~ [ AND (State, Sta te, ... )] 
(3) Epi sode ----> Event + Reaction 
==:) [ INITI ATE (Event, React ion ) ] 
(4) Event -, {Episode / Change-of- state / Action / Event + Event) 
==:) [CAUSE (EventJ , Event2 ) or ALLOW (Event!, Event , )] 
(s ) Reaction ----> Internal Response + Overt Response 
==:) [ MOTIVATE (Internal l-i.esponse, Overt Response) J 
(6) Internal Response ----> {Emotion / Desire} 
(7) Overt Response -> {Action/ (Attempt) *) 
==:) [THEN (Attempt J , Attempt2 , •• • ) J 
(8) Attempt -> Plan + Applicat ion 
==:) [ MOTIVATE (Plan, Appli cat ion )] 
(9) Appli cation - , (Preaction)* + Acti on + Consequence 
==:) [ ALLOW (AND (Preact ion, P reaction, .), CA USE 
INITIATE ALLOW (Action, Consequence)] 
(0) Preaction --> Subgoal + (Attempt) * 
(1) Consequence --> {Reaction /Event} 
* The aster isk means that the node in the parcntheses may bc repeated more than once. 
Each rule is a pai r of a syntactic rule and a semantic interpretation rule, except for 
Rule (6) and Rule (11), for which no explanations were given for their omissions. One 
of the serious defects in Rumelhart's schema is the redundancy of the semantic inter-
pretation, which is simply a duplication of the syntactic information. The only difference 
between the two parts of the pair is the specification of logical relations, which are 
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expressed in capital letters (i.e. , ALLUW, AND, INiTIATE, MOTIVATE, and CAUSE) . 
These logical relations can be better dealt with in the conventions for rule interpreta-
tion or application rather than being specified in the rule format itself, thus redundantly 
duplicating the same information twice. Moreover, the meanings and/or functions of the 
different logical relations are not justified. Except for AND, the remaining four rela-
tions are synonymous. No justifiable reasons can be found for the use of four different 
terms for the basically the same function which is "to make something happen." 
The plus sign( +) shows that the two terms should be chosen and re-written in the 
order given. The vertical line between items shows that the items are alternative. In 
Rule (4), for instance, event is re-written as episode, change-of-state, action, or event 
+ event. Rules (3) and (4) make up a recursive set with which an episode can be 













Fig. 1. l{ccursive se t (l< ul es (3) and (1)) 
However, Rumelhart's rule schema does not allow for the coordination of episodes, 
represented in Figure 2, which is quite frequent in natural stories. His rules generate 




Episode . Episode 
Fig. 2. Coordination of episodes, which is not possible in Rumelhart's schema 
Setting aside minor questions about the schema, e.g., the use of dots, one additional 
point which should be mentioned is the absence of the category of "goal" in the pre-
sence of the explicitly mentioned "subgoal" in Rule (10). 
2. Stein and Glenn Cl (79) 
Stein and Glenn's (1979: 60) story grammar is a revision of Rumelhart's (1975), in 
which the semantic interpretations are incorporated with the syntactic formation rules. 
In Stein and Glenn's grammar, the problem of ambiguity of the terms for semantic/ 
logical relations remains, that is, the differential functions of ALLOW, MOTIV ATE, 
and INITIATE tJa ve not- been resolved. 
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'fable 3. S tein and Glenn' s rules 
( l) Story -. ALLOW (Setting, Episode System) 
(2) Setting - . S tate (s) 
Action (s) 
(3) Ep isode System --+ AND 
THEN (Episode (s» 
CAUSE 
(4) Episode --+ IN ITIATE ( Initiating Event, Response) 
(5) Initiating Event --+ Natural Occurrence (s) 
Action (s) 
Internal Event(s) 
(6) Response --+ MOT! V ATE (Internal Response, P lan Scq lIcnee) 
(7) Interna l Response --+ Goal (s) 
Affect (s) 
Cogn it ion (s) 
(1:\) Plan Sequence -> INITIATE ( Intemal P lall, Plan Appli cati on) 
(9) Internal Plan --+ Cognition(s) 
Subgoal (s) 
(10) Plan Applicati on --+ RESULT (Attempt, Resolu tion) 
(11) Attempt --+ Aetion(s) 
(12) Resolution --+ INITIAT E (Direct Consequence , Reacti on) 
(13) Direct Consequence -> Natural Occurrence(s) 
Action(s) 
End State (s) 
(14) Reaction --+ Affect(s) 
Cognition (s) 
Action(s) 
Three new logical relations, which were not found in Rumelhart's grammar, appear 
in Stein and Glenn's- RESULT, AND, and THEN. Again, RESULT does not differ 
from ALLOW, MOTIVATE, or INITIATE. In Stein and Glenn's, AND, THEN, and 
CAUSE function in the same location. AND represents a simultaneous or a temporal 
relation ; THEN, a temporal but not a direct causal relation ; and CAUSE, a temporal 
relation which is causal in nature. For instance, Rule (3) expands an episodic system 
into a number of episodes, in which the logical relation between any two of the episodes 
is AND, THEN, or CAUSE as shown in F'igure 3. 
Episode Episode l THEN, Episode 
or CAUSE) 
Fig. 3. Logical relations between episodes 
An inconsistency in Stein and Glenn's rule format is found in the fact that they have 
assumed the three logical relations- AND, THEN, and CAUSE- between other subcom-
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ponents other than episodes in Rule (3). For instance, the three relations are possible 
between a natural occurrence and an action, and between an action and an internal 
event in Rule (5). Despite this fact, it is only in Rule (3) that these logical relations 
are overtly mentioned. Rule (3) in Stein and Glenn 's grammar has remedied Rumel-
hart's grammar by making the coordinate sequence of episodes possible. However, they 
did not incorporate the recursive mechanism in the grammar, which Rumelhart had in 
his grammar. Thus, Stein and Glenn's grammar generates coordinations of episodes, but 
it blocks the embeddings of episodes. 
3. Thorndyke (1977) 
Thorndyke's (1977; 79) grammar is another version of model which IS among the 
revisions of Rumelhart's (1975) grammar. 
Table 4. Thorndykc's rules 
Cl ) S tory ----> Sctting + Theme + Plot + Resolution 
(2) Se tting ----> Cha racters+ Location + Time 
(3) Theme ----> (Event) * + Goal 
(4) Plol ----> Epi sode* 
(5) Epi sodc --, Subgoal + Attempt*+Outcome 
{
Event* 
( u ) , \ llel11pl --,' Episode 
{
Evcnt* 
\ 7) Uulcu mc ----> Slale 
( t) ) Re~u luli un ----> {~;aell~t 
Subgoal} , (9) Goal ----> DeSired State 
Characters} 
(i0) Location ----> State 
Time 
One characteristic of Thorndyke's grammar, which , makes his grammar unique, is 
found in Rule (0, which states four requisite components of all stories. They are set-
ting, theme, plot, and resolution. Theme of the story, for Thorndyke, is the "general 
fO CllS to which the subsequent plot adheres" (p. 80), and it contains the goal for the 
protagonist lo achieve. The plot of the story is "an indefinite number of episodes, each 
of which is a cluster of actions comprising attempts to achieve the subgoal and the 
outcomes of these attempts" (p. 80) . 
Another characteristic of Thorndyke's grammar is its simplicity, which is shown by 
the reduced number of rules, which is ten, as compared with Stein and Glenn's 14 
rules. However, the simplicity is mainly achieved by sacrificing the components for the 
representations of psychological cognitions, such categories as response, which include 
,internal responses and internal plans, 
284 
The third point which is worth noticing in Thorndyke's grammar IS Rule (2) for 
setting. He has specified three components of setting in a sequential order- character-l-
location -I- time- which differ from others' grammars, in which the setting is first re-
written as a sequence of states, each state then representing characters, locations, or 
time. Thorndyke's rule for setting, thus, can be said to represent lower-level compo-
nents, i. e., components which are closer to the surface. The problem with Rule (2), 
however, arises as to the validity of the linear sequence of the three components. There 
seems to be no a priori reason or principle by which we could posit characters before 
location, and location, in turn, before time. 
Fourthly, Rules (9) and (10) are ad hoc in that these rules re-write lower-components 
to higher-level categories, which contradicts the general principle of rules that rules 
represent a hierarchical structure of the story components. It seems that Thorndyke 
wanted somehow to show that each of the components of a story is intrinsically either 
an event or a state. However, in achieving this, he violated a more basic principle of 
hierarchical structure. This was caused by the fact that he formulated the higher-level 
rules, e.g., Rule (2), with components which are too close to the surface forms. 
Finally, Thorndyke did not mention at a ll about the logical relations, such as AND, 
THEN, and CAUSE. A possible explanation for this might be that the logical relations 
should be dealt with in other parts of the grammar, outside the rules, possibly in terms 
of general conventions for the interpretations of rules. If this had been the case, he 
should have clearly mentioned his position. 
4. Mandler and Johnson (1977) 
Mandler and Johnson's (1977: 117) grammar is most complicated and has the largest 
number of rules, 18 in all, among the four grammars being reviewed here. 
Table 5. Mandler and Johnson' s rules 
(1 ) Fable ---+ Story AND Moral 
(2) Story ---+ Setting AND Event Structure 
(3) S tr {State* (AND Event*)} e mg --+ Event* 
(4) State* --+ State «AND State)") 
(5) Event* --+ Event «{~~gN }Event)") «AND State)") 
CAUSE 
(6) Event Structure ---+ Episode « THEN Episode)") 
(7) Episode ---+ Beginning CAUSE Development CAUSE Ending 
(8) Beginning ---+{EEv~ntd*} 
P ISO e 
(9) Dev lopm t {SimPle Reaction CAUSE Action } 
e en ---+ Complex Reaction CAUSE Goal Path 
(IO ) Simple Reaction ---+ Internal Event «CAUSE Internal Event)") 
(11 ) Action ---+ Event 
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(12) Complex Reaction -------> Simple Reaction CAUSE Goal 
(13) Goal -------> Internal State 
(14) Goal Patl {Attempt CAUSE Outcome } 
1 -------> Goal Path (CAUSE Goal Path)" 
(15) Attempt -- Event'" 
. . {Event* } (16) Attempt --. Episode 
{
EVent* (AND EmPhaSiS)} 
(17) Ending - . Emphas is 
Episode 
(18) Emphasis -- State 
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Mandler and Johnson's first rule delimits their objects of study to the fable, which 
consists of a story and a moral. The fable is one of the typical forms of story which 
are usually transmitted orally from person to person, or from one generation to the 
next. In fact, the forms of story which are being studied by cognitive psychologists, 
except for Kintsch and van Dijk's, are limited to very "naively simple" story structures. 
There seem to be two reasons for this. One has to do with the ratl)er short history of 
studies on stories that they are now only beginning to understand the basic simple 
structures of stories. The other has to do with the purposes of cognitive psychology 
that its main task is to tap human memory and its information processing. The stories, 
therefore, should be short in length, simple in structure, and easy to be retained in 
memory and thus recalled with least difficulty. 
Another characteristic of Mandler and Johnson's grammar is found in their effort to 
specify each of the logical relations in the rules, which gievs an impression of clum-
siness to the rule format. However, if the logical relations are not to be dealt :with in 
the interpretive conventions, Mandler and Johnson's solution seems to be the best we 
can do at present. 
Table 6. Dog Story 
(l) It happened that a dog had got a piece of meat (Setting, Event) 
(2) and was ca rry ing it home in his mouth. (Se tting, Event) 
(3) Now on his way home he had to cross a plank lying across a stream. (Setting, State) 
(4) As he crossed he looked down (Beginning, Event) 
(5) and saw his own shadow reflec ted in the water beneath. (Beginning, Event) 
(6) Thinking it was another dog with another piece of meat, (Complex Reaction, Simple Reac-
tion, Internal State) 
(7) he made up his mind to have that also. (Complex Reaction, Goal, Internal State) 
(8) So he made a snap at the shadow, (Goal Path, Attempt, Event) 
(9) but as he opened his mouth the piece of meat fell out, (Goal Path, Outcome, Event) 
(10) dropped into the water, (Goal Path. Outcome, Event) 
(11) and was never seen again. (Ending, Emphasis, State) 
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A simple story is given in Table 6, "Dog Story," for illustration, which is composed 
of 11 propositions. And this story is analyzed by Mandler and Johnson's story grammar 






A Event Structure 
EPiLde 
/c~---EVfnt Event Sta\.~ Beginning D~pment Ending 
1 I I ~ ,!. '-.'G I El. Cl ) (2) (3) Event· Complex C oa . mpnasl~ 
~~ A Stt 
event C Event ________ 2 "" / \ ~ "--- ( 11 ) ! I Simple Goal Attempt Outcome 
( ~ ) (5) ReTio:, 1 I I 
Internal Internal Event· event· 
Event State I .A" 
I I .Event Event C )vent 
(6) (7) I j I 
oh (9) (IO) 
Fig. 4. Tree·diagram for Dog Story 
(Numbers in parentheses show the propositions given in 
Table 6. Single cap ital letters: A = AND, T = THEN, C = CAUSE) 
Looking from the propositions up in the tree-diagram, we find either an event or a 
state in the preterminal nodes. Only by going up further can we find the functional 
designation for each proposition, such as setting, beginning, simple reaction, goal, 
attempt, outcome, or ending. In this way, the story is represented in a hierarchical 
structure, beginning from an abstract level and progressing down to more and more 
concrete levels until each component terminates at a proposition, which is either an 
event or a state. 
Four story grammars have been reviewed, which showed quite a wide range of 
diversity, even though the latter three models are the revisions of the initial model of 
Rumelhart's. A number of questions have been raised above as to the redundant dupli -
cations, functional properties of some components, and the rule format. In light of 
these questions, a reasonable conclusion could be drawn that story grammars are in a 
state of fluctuation. This implies that further studies are urgently necessary to arrive 
at a form of story grammar which can survive these criticisms. 
Another aspect of the story grammar which needs our attention is the formalization of 
transformational rules, i.e., Kintsch and van Dijk's macro-rules, and their integration 
A Review of Story Grammars 287 
with the re-write rules. This mechanism is necessary because we have to assume a 
"unique" underlying structure for stories from which the diversified surface forms of 
story are derived. This composite mechanism of re-write and transformational rules is 
also indispensable to the interpretations of recall protocols because the recalled stories 
are not exact replications of the given stories. 
N. Developmental Studies 
Not many studies have been done on children's discourses and much less on narra-
tives. Stein and Glenn's (1979) work, however, deserves a careful attention because 
this study is most extensive among the studies of its kind, which are accessible to us. 
They conducted two experiments with four stories. Forty-eight children participated in 
the first experiment, 24 each from first grade and fifth grade. The mean ages in each 
grade were 6; 5 for first grade and 10; 6 for fifth grade. The distribution of males and 
females is approximately even in each group. The purpose in the first experiment 
was to tap the recall of the stories, with the ancillary investigation of transforma-
tions, i.e., additions/ deletions of information, and temporal sequencil1g errors in recall 
protocols. The recall was tested at two times, immediately after listening to the stories 
and one week later. Beside the obvious finding that the fifth graders recalled more 
story information than the first graders, there were a number of findings worth our 
scrutiny. 
First of all, they investigated the recall protocols in terms of seven major story 
categories- major setting statements (the introduction of major characters), minor set-
ting statements (the descriptions of locales and time), initiating events, internal res-
ponses, attempts, consequences, and reactions. The rank orders of the recall of the 
components for the four stories are shown in Table 7. 
In all stories, the major setting category was the best remembered. Initiating events 
and direct consequences are always the next best remembered categories. The three 
Table 7. Rank Orders of ca tegories for four stor ies" 
Component Stor y Story 2 Story 3 Story 4 
Major Setting 
Direct Consequence 2 3 2 2 
Initiati ng Eve nt 3 2 3 3 
Attemp t 4 5 4 4 
Reaction 5 4 7 
Minor Sett ing 6 7 6 5 
Internal Response 7 6 5 6 
* Ranks are integrated ove r grade and time because there were not significant variances be-
tween grades and between two times, except for internal response category (from Stein and 
Glenn 1979: 91) . 
288 
categories which were least remembered were reactions, minor settings, and internal 
responses. And internal response and minor setting categories were always recalled in 
the last three positions. The only category which showed significant grade effect in all 
four stories was the internal response category. Fifth-grade children recalled significantly 
more internal responses than first-grade children. It seems to be very important to note 
that the goal statement, which is part of the internal response category, accounts for 
the majority of the recalled internal responses, whereas the proportion of recall of 
psychological cogniti011s is 110t high. 
One interesting fact or important f inding is that the analysis of additions of new 
information to the stories which were not included in the original stories revealed that 
internal responses and attempts were most frequent. Forty-one percent of all r.ew 
categories added were internal responses and 37% were attempts. These added internal 
responses included not only the goal statements, but also a large number of cognitions, 
i. e., the characters' feelings and thoughts. The interpretation for this seemingly oppo-
sing results of the largest amount of newly added internal responses as against the lowest 
rank order of the internal responses among the recalled categories is elusive. The solu· 
tion to this opposing results seems to lie in the answer to the question of whether the 
children's actual cognitions of internal responses are different from the stated internal 
responses in the s Lories or the children's mental mechanism of production of the added 
information ~s different from that of comprehension of given information. 
Different amounts of inferences, another category of newly added information, were 
shown between the two grades. Across the four stories, the fifth graders produced twice 
as many inferences as the first graders. A typ ical example of the fifth-grade children's 
inference in one of the stories was "to cure her husband" or "to make him feel better" 
from "to make a medicine for her husband" in the original story. Moreover, many 
fifth-grade children added an inferential sentence at the end of the story to make the story 
more coherent. In contrast, the first·grade children added twice as many activity state-
ments as fifth -grade children did . This difference in the added informa Lion between the 
two grades seem to show different developmental stages in their cogni tive as well as 
linguistic abilities. Put differently, the fifth-.grade children seemed to be much advanced 
in the abilities of comprehension and product ion of causal relatiens when the first-grade 
children's abilities are limited to the appreciat ion of physica l activities of characters 
and objects. 
Developmental differences were not found when the temporal organization of story 
recall was examined. Children' s sequencing of story information matched closely the 
temporal sequence of categories in the original stories. Stein and Glenn (1979: 98-99) 
pointed out that their conclusion about the children' s ability of temporal sequencing 
contradicted the findings of Piaget (1960), who found the children of six to eight years 
of age recalled temporal sequences poorly_ Stein and Glenn (1979: 99) attributed this 
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contradiction to the differences in complexity of the different stories that were used. In 
addition, they emphasized the importance of causal relations to constructing an accurate 
temporal sequence in that when verbal descriptions in a story included such relations 
the ability to reconstruct the temporal sequence improved significantly in both age 
groups of children. 
Twenty-four different children were involved in the Stein and Glenn's (1979) second 
experiment, 12 first graders and another 12 fifth graders. One of the tasks in this 
experiment was to find out what piece of information the children considered important 
in the stories. After hearing each story, the children were asked what he/she thought 
was most important information. Next, they were again asked to give his/ her judgments 
of secondly and thirdly important statements in each story. The results of the children 's 
first judgments are reproduced in Table 8. 
Table 8. Proportions of judgme nt f o r the 11l 0 ~ t illlportant information 
(f rom Ste in and Glenn 1979: 104 ) 
Category 
Minor Setting 
Initia ting Event 


















The largest proportion was attributed to the category of direct consequence by the 
first-grade children, whereas the category of internal response was judged most impor-
tant by the fifth-grade children. The category of initiating event received either the 
second place or the third place in importance. As a whole, the three categories- internal 
response, direct consequence, and initiating event- ·are considered more important than 
other categories. These results appear to give more support to their findings about the 
added categories in the first experiment. However, we again have to notice the discre-
pancies between the order of frequencies of the recalled categories and the order of 
importance judgments. Major settings and initiating events, which were almost always 
found in the top of the recall frequencies, were included infrequently in the importance 
judgments. The interpretation of these discrepancies again raises a question the answer 
to which is not definitive. 
The second task in the second experiment was to find out the children's understand-
ing of cause-effect relations in the stories. Each child was asked to answer fifteen probe 
questions, all "why" questions (e.g., "why did the lady need a tiger's whisker?, Why 
was the lady afraid?), which could be answered only when the child could relate two 
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or more statements causally. The results showed that the proportions of correct answers 
to the probe questions did not differ significantly between the two grades of children. 
However, the amounts of language produced per probe question were different. Fifth 
graders produced significantly more statements per probe question than did the first 
graders (1. 56 for fifth graders versus 1. 06 for first graders, p<. al). Moreover, the 
qualities of language were different in that the fifth graders often connected statements 
with causal or temporal connectors, such as because, so that, and then, in order to, etc. 
These types of connectors almost never appeared in the first graders' responses. A large 
portion of the children's answers to the probe questions were made up of internal res-
ponses, either those explicitly stated in the original stories or the inferences which the 
children added. Furthermore. many of the internal responses that were poorly recalled 
in the first experiment were frequently produced in response to these probe questions 
by children from both rtge groups. This fact again brings out the repeated question 
:1bout the psychological reality or state of the category of internal response. 
Stein's (1979) study is a good review of the studies on children's narratives in the 
framework of story grammar. Included in this review are a number of studies by Stein 
and her colleagues, and the main conclusions in these studies are shown to be in agree-
ment with the findings in Stein and Glenn (1979). Figure 5 (Stein 1979: 276) clearly 
demonstrated the differential recall proportions of different story categories by first-
grade and fifth-grade children. 
Mandler and Johnson (1977) conducted a recall test for 21 subjects representing child-
ren of first and fourth grades and university students. Four stories were tape-recorded 
and presented to the subjects. Each subject recalled two stories. The results from this 
study are shown in Figure 6. 
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F ig. 6. Mean proport ions of clauses and propositions in basic nodes recalled by 
firs t- and fourth -grade r s and ad ults (from Mandler and Johnson 1977 : 144 ) 
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recalled, and attempts, endings, and reactions were poorly recalled. The fourth graders 
showed a similar pattern of recall , although there was no longer a significant differen· 
tiation between the recalls of attempts and outcomes. The adults recalled attempts 
a lmost as well as settings, beginnings, and outcomes. Recall of endings and reactions 
still lagged significantly. The only node which did not show a significant age trend was 
outcomes. 
The main characteristic which distinguishes the story schema of children from that 
of adults can be found in the recall of outcomes and reactions in that children placed 
greater weight on outcomes than on attempts and least emphasis on reactions, whereas 
adults recalled attempts and reactions more frequently. 
The category of "clauses" stands for "elaborative clauses," which was recalled signi-
ficantly more by adults than by children. Differences between first graders and fourth 
graders are found in the amounts of outcomes and attempts recalled. The first graders 
recalled outcomes more than the fourth graders did. On the other hand, attempts 
were recalled more by the fourth graders. As far as the major story components are 
concerned, Mandler and ]ohnson's results did not contradict any of the conclusions 
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nrrived at by Stein and Glenn ( 1979). 
1'. Conclusion and Prospective Studies 
Four story grammars were reviewed and flaws in the grammars were pointed ou t. 
Tn addition, Stein and Glenn's (979), Stein's (1979), and Mandler and Johnson' s (1977) 
s luciies on children's narratives were explained. 
The original purpose of the story grammar for cognitive psychologists was to use it 
as a theoretical framework to investigate human memory capability. Therefore, most 
studies which have been done since Rumelhart's (1975) story grammar came into being 
were for comprehension of stories, almost exclusively by means of recall of stories. Not 
much attention was given to the possibilities of using the story grammar for the study 
of story production, let alone serious researches. Stein and Glenn (1979 : 118-19; Stein 
1979) seem to be the only persons who showed an interest in the children 's narrative 
production. Stein and Glenn's (1979) initial findings about children' s spontaneous story 
production were as follows: 
It is assumed th at the structures that influence the comprehension of stor ies also influence the 
spontaneous generat ion of stories. Thus, the type and sequen ce of ca tegor ies generated in spon-
taneous stories should be similar to th e proposed in ternal r epresentation [story gra mmar or 
schema ]. 
... , there appear to be cri t ica l differences between story comprehension and story prod ucti on. 
Children in first and second grade fr equently generate s tor ies that include onl y major and minor 
setting statements, e. g. , description s of characters' physica l sta tes, act i vi ties, and recurren t 
desires. Older child ren begin to generate be ha vioral sequences defin ed in an ep isode but omit 
critica l categories and rela tions which are critical in th e development of a logica l sequence of 
events .... in the former the compl ete logical seq uence is inh erent ill the story, i.e. , the items 
are prearranged. When a subject spontaneously constructs a s tory, the logical r elationships be-
tween categories and/ or episodes are often not apparent to the subjec t until he has begun pro-
duction. In order fo r the story to contain a logica l flow of events, many have to rework 1 he 
information they have generated in ord er to develop a ll possible producti ons (pp. 118-J I9). 
Stein and Glenn assumed the same story schema for both comprehension and produc-
tion. The differences between the two tasks, for them, consisted in the different pro-
cesses of execution of the story schema. One thing worth noticing in the quotation given 
above is that their task was the "spontaneous" story production, which was least cont-
rolled. As an investigation of cognitive ability of children of first or second grade, or 
even those of fifth or six grade, the spontaneous story production seems to be not 
appropriate. Unless certain controb are placed on the task of story production, rather 
stringent ones, the stories produced bear little or no relevance to either the cognitive 
capability or the children's ability of employing the story schema or schemata. Limita-
tion on the story topic is the first possible step for control. The use of medium, e.g., 
pictures, can place children in a reasonable situation in which their story production 
could take a clearly defined direction. A sequence of logically related pictures seems to 
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be recommendable (Schmidt and Paris 1978). Use of toys is also thinkable, even though 
it may require a little higher intellect than the use of pictures (Waltz 1981). Future 
studies on narratives should, of necessity, include extensive research on the production 
of stories; it has a particular import for the developmental studies of children's language 
and/ or cognitive growth. 
The primary requisite to the production study is the construction and formalization 
of a new schema for stories, which is more general in nature to be applicable to the 
interpretations of both production and comprehension. It should contain the interpretive 
power for both hierarchical and coordinating story structures. A theoretical rule me· 
chanism should be devised which could link up transformational rules to the base re-
write rules. 
Certain portions of the story information, e.g., inferences and elaborations, should be 
dealt with, possibly by means of transformational rules, i.e., Kinsch and van Dijk's 
(1978) macro-rules. The functions of inferential materials and elaborative utterances 
are crucial in the study of stories and children's cognitive development (Kern an 1977; 
]ohnson and Smith 1981; Reder 1980; Warren, Nicholas, and Trabasso 1979) . 
Another area in the study of discourse which is almost completely left unexplored is 
the relationship between linguistics and story structures. One of the linguistic/ semantic 
elements which is of particular interest in the discourse study is the definite and inde-
finite references. A discourse from a linguistic viewpoint is a coherent whole the com-
ponents of which are linked together by linguistic cohesive devices, the most important 
of which is the referential system via definitiza tion and pronominalization (Hawkins 
1976, 1978; Maratsos 1976; Clark and Haviland 1977; Clark and Marshall 1981; Ro-
chester and Martin 1977; du Bois 1980; Emslie and Stevenson 1981; Prince 1981). 
In addition, it is worth noting that there is a necessity of sharpening of the general 
knowledge and/or belief framework which delimits the boundaries of human intellectual 
activities. The story schema is a specific token of the general "schema/schemata" for 
knowledge and/ or beliefs, which are intrinsically universal, but also culturally specific. 
(Tannen 1979; Clements 1979; Shaklee 1979; Lichtenstein and Brewer 1980). Story 
production and comprehension should be studied in a well-formed story schema which 
is reasonably constrained by system or systems of general human knowledge and beliefs. 
In closing this paper, the pros and cons about story grammars should be briefed. 
Black and Wilensky (1979) were the first who questioned the utility or validity of 
story grammars in the general field of cognitive science. Their questions were imme-
diately answered by a number of story grammarians (Rumelhart 1980; Mandler and 
]ohnson 1980; Frisch and PerIis 1981; Mandler 1982; Stein 1982) with further sup-
port for the psychological reality of the story constituents as have been elaborated in 
the story grammars (Haberlandt 1980; Mandler and Goodman 1982; Bisanz 1982). 
Johnson and Mandler (1980) also showed a neW direction in which future improvements 
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of story grammars could feasibly be achieved. Other cntlclsms of story grammars 
(Black and Bower 1980; Weaver and Dickinson 1982) from the camp of artificial in-
telligence ha ve simply shown the necessity of exploration of different levels of human 
processing of information contained in discourse. 
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